Agnihotri Anustubh, Gadgil Ashok, Madon Temina, “A Framework For Development Engineering” in Gadgil Ashok, Madon Temina, Anderson R, Casaburi L, Lee K, Rezaee A (Eds.) (2021) An Introduction to Development Engineering. Springer (Book manuscript accepted by Springer) Chapter 1 Chapter 3
Post Alison, Agnihotri Anustubh, and Hyun Chris, “Using Crowd-Sourced Data to Study Public Services: Lessons from Urban India.”, Studies in Comparative International Development 53.3 (2018): 324-342. PDF Link Abstract
As cities throughout the developing world grow, they often expand more quickly than the infrastructure and service delivery networks that provide residents with basic necessities such as water and public safety. Why do some cities deliver more effective infrastructure and services in the face of rapid growth than others? Why do some households and communities secure better services than others? Answering these questions requires studying the large, politicized bureaucracies charged with providing urban services, especially the relationships between frontline workers, agency managers, and citizens in informal settlements. Researchers investigating public service delivery in cities of the Global South, however, have faced acute data scarcity when addressing these themes. The recent emergence of crowd-sourced data offers researchers new means of addressing such questions. In this paper, we draw on our own research on the politics of urban water delivery in India to highlight new types of analysis that are possible using crowd-sourced data and propose solutions to common pitfalls associated with analyzing it. These insights should be of use for researchers working on a broad range of topics in comparative politics where crowd-sourced data could provide leverage, such as protest politics, conflict processes, public opinion, and law and order.
Smith, Todd G., Joshua Busby, and Anustubh Agnihotri. “Sub-national African Education and Infrastructure Access Data.” Austin, TX: Strauss Center for International Security and Law (2013).
Agnihotri, Anustubh. Patterns of regional disparity in health outcomes in India. Diss. 2012.
Agnihotri Anustubh, “Organizational Coherence, Bureaucratic Transfers, and Local State Capacity” [Under Review] Abstract
This paper focuses on the politics of bureaucratic transfers. I show how preferences of individual bureaucrats over being assigned to particular jurisdictions shapes the territorial reach of the state. I examine transfer orders allocating close to a 600 bureaucrats across 300 jurisdictions over an eight year period. Using a unique feature of the data, modification of transfer orders issued by the bureaucracy based on requests initiated by bureaucrats, I show that bureaucrats regularly lobby to annul transfer orders that place them further away from home locations or require relocation across a large distance. These lobbying efforts by bureaucrats negatively impact state capacity by reducing state presence in peripheral jurisdictions. The findings move beyond the role of external actors in shaping bureaucratic decision-making and shed light on how dynamics within the bureaucracy impact local state capacity.
Agnihotri Anustubh, “How do informal institutions shape attempts to modernize bureaucracy using information-technology?” [Under Review] Abstract
Can market competition between intermediaries improve the quality of citizen-state interactions? I test this question in the context of a public-private partnership (PPP) policy that created a network of digital intermediaries – individuals authorized to submit online and digitized applications on behalf of citizens for a fee. I use the overtime and staggered expansion of the intermediary network to identify the relationship between the number of intermediaries and the quality of citizen-state interactions. I use multiple indicators linked to state responsiveness to measure the quality of citizen-state interactions and find that having more intermediaries in a jurisdiction has no impact on the citizen experience in engaging with the state. Why does an increase in the presence of intermediaries not change how citizens engage with the state? I argue that digital intermediaries selected by the state have limited incentives to compete in the market for citizen applications. To establish the motivations of digital intermediaries, I juxtapose their functioning against informal intermediaries, who submitted paper-based applications before the state moved citizen applications online. Based on qualitative interviews and data on the transition from paper-based to online applications, I show that the design of the PPP policy creates entry barriers and limits market competition. The lack of relationship between the expansion of the intermediary network and the quality of citizen-state interactions has important implications for how low and middle-income countries deploy information technology for digitizing citizen interfacing governance processes. I conclude by providing policy prescriptions for how the digitization of citizen services can improve citizen experience engaging with the state.
Agnihotri Anustubh and Chowdhury Anirvan, “Electoral Dominance in Democratic Regimes: Evidence from West Bengal, India.” [Presented at Comparative Politics Conference (COMPASS) at UCLA, 2019] Abstract
Can the decline of a hegemonic party through peaceful democratic transition create conditions for greater political contestation? This paper shows that lack of political competition has long term consequences for democratic practice. Using granular electoral data from a state in India, the world’s largest democracy, we find that local governments that experience electoral dominance under a one-party rule are less likely to be competitive when a new party comes to power. Further, we show that the means of coercion used to maintain electoral dominance: limiting contestation by political opponents through the use of violence and intimidation persist even after the incumbent party loses power. These results add to our understanding of democracy as a hybrid regime by examining how political parties can use decentralization of power to local governments to create the conditions for one-party dominance with semi-authoritarian characteristics.
Agnihotri Anustubh and Chowdhury Anirvan, “Party Alignment and Fiscal Transfers: Evidence from West Bengal, India.” [Presented at Americal Political Science Association Conference at Washington DC, 2019] Abstract
How do political parties influence the implementation of welfare policies in developing democracies? This paper explores the importance of party linkages between local and higher-level governments in determining the allocation of financial resources for welfare programs. We show that vertical party linkages between local and higher levels of government are crucial in explaining the allocation of welfare funds at the local level: co-partisan local governments are rewarded with greater financial resources while opposition strongholds see a strong reduction in funds. We suggest that the party adopts a reward and punishment strategy to consolidate its political position. The paper adds to our understanding of how non-programmatic implementation of policies is shaped by party linkages across different levels of government.
Agnihotri, Anustubh. “Exploring Attitudes Towards Lower-Caste Groups and Religious Minorities in Urban India”.